Commit a394cbd2 authored by Kurt Zeilenga's avatar Kurt Zeilenga
Browse files

Sync with HEAD

parent e4f3cd71
......@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ int use_tls = 0;
int assertctl;
char *assertion = NULL;
char *authzid = NULL;
int manageDIT = 0;
int manageDSAit = 0;
int noop = 0;
int ppolicy = 0;
......@@ -133,6 +134,9 @@ N_(" [!]chaining[=<resolveBehavior>[/<continuationBehavior>]]\n")
N_(" one of \"chainingPreferred\", \"chainingRequired\",\n")
N_(" \"referralsPreferred\", \"referralsRequired\"\n")
#endif /* LDAP_CONTROL_X_CHAINING_BEHAVIOR */
#ifdef LDAP_DEVEL
N_(" [!]manageDIT\n")
#endif
N_(" [!]manageDSAit\n")
N_(" [!]noop\n")
#ifdef LDAP_CONTROL_PASSWORDPOLICYREQUEST
......@@ -256,6 +260,20 @@ tool_args( int argc, char **argv )
assert( authzid == NULL );
authzid = cvalue;
} else if ( strcasecmp( control, "manageDIT" ) == 0 ) {
if( manageDIT ) {
fprintf( stderr,
"manageDIT control previously specified\n");
exit( EXIT_FAILURE );
}
if( cvalue != NULL ) {
fprintf( stderr,
"manageDIT: no control value expected\n" );
usage();
}
manageDIT = 1 + crit;
} else if ( strcasecmp( control, "manageDSAit" ) == 0 ) {
if( manageDSAit ) {
fprintf( stderr,
......@@ -720,7 +738,12 @@ tool_args( int argc, char **argv )
}
}
if( protocol == LDAP_VERSION2 ) {
if( authzid || manageDSAit || noop || ppolicy ) {
if( assertctl || authzid || manageDIT || manageDSAit ||
#ifdef LDAP_CONTROL_X_CHAINING_BEHAVIOR
chaining ||
#endif
noop || ppolicy || preread || postread )
{
fprintf( stderr, "%s: -e/-M incompatible with LDAPv2\n", prog );
exit( EXIT_FAILURE );
}
......@@ -968,7 +991,7 @@ void
tool_server_controls( LDAP *ld, LDAPControl *extra_c, int count )
{
int i = 0, j, crit = 0, err;
LDAPControl c[9], **ctrls;
LDAPControl c[10], **ctrls;
ctrls = (LDAPControl**) malloc(sizeof(c) + (count+1)*sizeof(LDAPControl*));
if ( ctrls == NULL ) {
......@@ -1014,6 +1037,14 @@ tool_server_controls( LDAP *ld, LDAPControl *extra_c, int count )
i++;
}
if ( manageDIT ) {
c[i].ldctl_oid = LDAP_CONTROL_MANAGEDIT;
BER_BVZERO( &c[i].ldctl_value );
c[i].ldctl_iscritical = manageDIT > 1;
ctrls[i] = &c[i];
i++;
}
if ( manageDSAit ) {
c[i].ldctl_oid = LDAP_CONTROL_MANAGEDSAIT;
BER_BVZERO( &c[i].ldctl_value );
......
......@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ extern int use_tls;
extern char *assertion;
extern char *authzid;
extern int manageDIT;
extern int manageDSAit;
extern int noop;
extern int ppolicy;
......
......@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ main( int argc, char **argv )
tool_bind( ld );
if ( assertion || authzid || manageDSAit || noop ) {
if ( assertion || authzid || manageDIT || manageDSAit || noop ) {
tool_server_controls( ld, NULL, 0 );
}
......
......@@ -310,11 +310,11 @@ main( int argc, char **argv )
}
#endif
if ( assertion || authzid || manageDSAit || noop || preread || postread
if ( assertion || authzid || manageDIT || manageDSAit || noop
#ifdef LDAP_GROUP_TRANSACTION
|| txn
#endif
)
|| preread || postread )
{
int err;
int i = 0;
......
......@@ -9,7 +9,9 @@ output in multiple formats.
sdf -2html guide.sdf # generate HTML for release
sdf -2txt guide.sdf # generate TXT for release
More information (and SDF software) can be obtained from the
SDF website at:
http://www.mincom.com/mtr/sdf/
More information about STF can be obtained from the CPAN at:
http://search.cpan.org/src/IANC/sdf-2.001/doc/catalog.html
SDF itself can be obtained at:
http://search.cpan.org/~ianc/sdf-2.001/
......@@ -61,10 +61,12 @@ and
.B meta
database.
This is because operational attributes related to entry creation and
modification should not be used, as they could be passed to the target
servers, generating an error.
The current implementation automatically sets ldapmod to off, so its use
is redundant and can be safely omitted.
modification should not be proxied, as they could be mistakenly written
to the target server(s), generating an error.
The current implementation automatically sets lastmod to off, so its use
is redundant and should be omitted, because the lastmod directive will
be deprecated in the future.
.TP
.B uri <ldapurl>
LDAP server to use. Multiple URIs can be set in in a single
......@@ -75,76 +77,130 @@ call the first server of the list that responds, e.g.
\fBuri "ldap://host/ ldap://backup-host"\fP
The URI list is space- or comma-separated.
This statement is mandatory.
.\".TP
.\".B server <hostport>
.\"Obsolete option; same as `uri ldap://<hostport>/'.
.TP
.B acl-authcDN "<administrative DN for access control purposes>"
DN which is used to query the target server for acl checking; it
is supposed to have read access on the target server to attributes used
on the proxy for acl checking.
.HP
.hy 0
.B acl-bind
.B bindmethod=simple|sasl [binddn=<simple DN>] [credentials=<simple password>]
.B [saslmech=<SASL mech>] [secprops=<properties>] [realm=<realm>]
.B [authcId=<authentication ID>] [authzId=<authorization ID>]
.RS
Allows to define the parameters of the authentication method that is
internally used by the proxy to collect info related to access control.
The identity defined by this directive, according to the properties
associated to the authentication method, is supposed to have read access
on the target server to attributes used on the proxy for ACL checking.
The
.B secprops
field is currently ignored.
There is no risk of giving away such values; they are only used to
check permissions.
.B The acl-authcDN identity is by no means implicitly used by the proxy
The default is to use
.BR simple ,
with empty binddn and credentials,
which means that the related operations will be performed anonymously.
.B This identity is by no means implicitly used by the proxy
.B when the client connects anonymously.
See the
.B idassert-*
.B idassert-bind
feature instead.
.TP
.B acl-passwd <password>
Password used with the
.B
acl-authcDN
above.
.TP
.B idassert-authcdn "<administrative DN for proxyAuthz purposes>"
DN which is used to propagate the client's identity to the target
by means of the proxyAuthz control when the client does not
belong to the DIT fragment that is being proxyied by back-ldap.
This is useful when operations performed by users bound to another
backend are propagated through back-ldap.
This requires the entry with
.B idassert-authcdn
identity on the remote server to have
This directive obsoletes
.BR acl-authcDN ,
and
.BR acl-passwd .
.RE
.HP
.hy 0
.B idassert-bind
.B bindmethod=none|simple|sasl [binddn=<simple DN>] [credentials=<simple password>]
.B [saslmech=<SASL mech>] [secprops=<properties>] [realm=<realm>]
.B [authcId=<authentication ID>] [authzId=<authorization ID>]
.B [authz={native|proxyauthz}] [mode=<mode>] [flags=<flags>]
.RS
Allows to define the parameters of the authentication method that is
internally used by the proxy to authorize connections that are
authenticated by other databases.
The identity defined by this directive, according to the properties
associated to the authentication method, is supposed to have auth access
on the target server to attributes used on the proxy for authentication
and authorization, and to be allowed to authorize the users.
This requires to have
.B proxyAuthz
privileges on a wide set of DNs, e.g.
.BR authzTo=dn.subtree:"" ,
and the remote server to have
.B authz-policy
set to
set to
.B to
or
or
.BR both .
See
See
.BR slapd.conf (5)
for details on these statements and for remarks and drawbacks about
their usage.
.TP
.B idassert-passwd <password>
Password used with the
.B idassert-authcdn
above.
.TP
.B idassert-mode <mode> [<flags>]
defines what type of
.I identity assertion
is used.
The supported bindmethods are
\fBnone|simple|sasl\fP
where
.B none
is the default, i.e. no \fIidentity assertion\fP is performed.
The authz parameter is used to instruct the SASL bind to exploit
.B native
SASL authorization, if available; since connections are cached,
this should only be used when authorizing with a fixed identity
(e.g. by means of the
.B authzDN
or
.B authzID
parameters).
Otherwise, the default
.B proxyauthz
is used, i.e. the proxyAuthz control is added to all operations.
The supported modes are:
\fB<mode> := {legacy|anonymous|none|<id>|self}\fP
\fB<mode> := {legacy|anonymous|none|self}\fP
If
.B <mode>
is not present, and
.B authzId
is given, the proxy always authorizes that identity.
.B <authorization ID>
can be
\fB<flags> := {override}\fP
\fBu:<user>\fP
\fB<id> := {u:<ID>|[dn:]<DN>}\fP
\fB[dn:]<DN>\fP
The former is supposed to be expanded by the remote server according
to the authz rules; see
.BR slapd.conf (5)
for details.
In the latter case, whether or not the
.B dn:
prefix is present, the string must pass DN validation and normalization.
The default is
The default mode is
.BR legacy ,
which implies that the proxy will bind as
.I idassert-authcdn
which implies that the proxy will either perform a simple bind as the
.I authcDN
or a SASL bind as the
.I authcID
and assert the client's identity when it is not anonymous.
Direct binds are always proxied.
The other modes imply that the proxy will always bind as
.IR idassert-authcdn ,
The other modes imply that the proxy will always either perform a simple bind
as the
.IR authcDN
or a SASL bind as the
.IR authcID ,
unless restricted by
.BR idassert-authzFrom
rules (see below), in which case the operation will fail;
......@@ -162,19 +218,10 @@ identity
will be asserted;
.BR none ,
which means that no proxyAuthz control will be used, so the
.I idassert-authcdn
.I authcDN
or the
.I authcID
identity will be asserted.
Moreover, if a string prefixed with
.B u:
or
.B dn:
is used as
.BR <mode> ,
that identity will be asserted.
Ths string is also treated as a DN if it is not prefixed
by any recognized type indicator. Whether or not the
.B dn:
prefix is present, the string must pass DN validation and normalization.
For all modes that require the use of the
.I proxyAuthz
control, on the remote server the proxy identity must have appropriate
......@@ -183,6 +230,7 @@ permissions, or the asserted identities must have appropriate
.I authzFrom
permissions. Note, however, that the ID assertion feature is mostly
useful when the asserted identities do not exist on the remote server.
When the
.B override
flag is used, identity assertion takes place even when the database
......@@ -190,7 +238,15 @@ is authorizing for the identity of the client, i.e. after binding
with the provided identity, and thus authenticating it, the proxy
performs the identity assertion using the configured identity and
authentication method.
This directive obsoletes
.BR idassert-authcDN ,
.BR idassert-passwd ,
.BR idassert-mode ,
and
.BR idassert-method .
.RE
.TP
.B idassert-authzFrom <authz-regexp>
if defined, selects what
......@@ -206,80 +262,135 @@ See
section related to
.BR authz-policy ,
for details on the syntax of this field.
.TP
.B idassert-method <method> [<saslargs>]
where valid method values are
\fB<method> := {none|simple|sasl}\fP
\fB<saslargs> := [mech=<mech>] [realm=<realm>] [authcid=<authcid>] [cred=<cred>] [authz={native|proxyauthz}]\fP
If method is
.IR sasl ,
extra parameters can be given as described above.
The default is
.BR simple ;
.B none
inhibits proxy authorization;
.B sasl
uses a SASL bind with the above parameters; if required,
.I authorization
is performed by means of native SASL mechanism, and no proxyAuthz
is used for subsequent operations.
.RE
.TP
.B proxy-whoami
.B proxy-whoami {NO|yes}
Turns on proxying of the WhoAmI extended operation. If this option is
given, back-ldap will replace slapd's original WhoAmI routine with its
own. On slapd sessions that were authenticated by back-ldap, the WhoAmI
request will be forwarded to the remote LDAP server. Other sessions will
be handled by the local slapd, as before. This option is mainly useful
in conjunction with Proxy Authorization.
.TP
.B rebind-as-user
.B rebind-as-user {NO|yes}
If this option is given, the client's bind credentials are remembered
for rebinds when chasing referrals. Useful in conjunction with
\fBchase-referrals\fP, useless if \fBdont-chase-referrals\fP is set.
.LP
.B chase-referrals
.br
.B dont-chase-referrals
.RS
for rebinds when chasing referrals. Useful when
\fBchase-referrals\fP is set to \fByes\P, useless otherwise.
.TP
.B chase-referrals {YES|no}
enable/disable automatic referral chasing, which is delegated to the
underlying libldap, with rebinding eventually performed if the
\fBrebind-as-user\fP directive is used. The default is to chase referrals.
.RE
.LP
.B tls-start
.br
.B tls-try-start
.br
.B tls-propagate
.br
.B tls-try-propagate
.RS
.TP
.B tls {[try-]start|[try-]propagate}
execute the start TLS extended operation when the connection is initialized;
only works if the URI directive protocol scheme is not \fBldaps://\fP.
The \fBtls-propagate\fP version issues the Start TLS exop only if the original
\fBpropagate\fP issues the Start TLS exop only if the original
connection did.
\fBtry-start-tls\fP and \fBtry-propagate-tls\fP continue operations
if start TLS failed.
.RE
The \fBtry-\fP prefix instructs the proxy to continue operations
if start TLS failed; its use is highly deprecated.
.TP
.B t-f-support {NO|yes|discover}
enable if the remote server supports absolute filters
(see \fIdraft-zeilenga-ldap-t-f\fP for details).
If set to
.BR discover ,
support is detected by reading the remote server's rootDSE.
.SH BACKWARD COMPATIBILITY
The LDAP backend has been heavily reworked between releases 2.2 and 2.3;
as a side-effect, some of the traditional directives have been
deprecated and should be no longer used.
.TP
.B server <hostname[:port]>
this directive is no longer supported. Use the
.B uri
directive as described above.
.TP
.B acl-authcDN "<administrative DN for access control purposes>"
DN which is used to query the target server for acl checking; it
is supposed to have read access on the target server to attributes used
on the proxy for acl checking.
There is no risk of giving away such values; they are only used to
check permissions.
.B The acl-authcDN identity is by no means implicitly used by the proxy
.B when the client connects anonymously.
See the
.B idassert-*
feature instead.
This directive is obsoleted by
.BR acl-bind ,
and may dismissed in the future.
.TP
.B acl-passwd <password>
Password used with the
.B
acl-authcDN
above.
This directive is obsoleted by
.BR acl-bind ,
and may be dismissed in the future.
.TP
.B idassert-authcDN "<administrative DN for proxyAuthz purposes>"
DN which is used to propagate the client's identity to the target
by means of the proxyAuthz control when the client does not
belong to the DIT fragment that is being proxyied by back-ldap.
This directive is obsoleted by
.BR idassert-bind ,
and may be dismissed in the future.
.TP
.B idassert-passwd <password>
Password used with the
.B idassert-authcDN
above.
This directive is obsoleted by
.BR idassert-bind ,
and may be dismissed in the future.
.TP
.B idassert-mode <mode> [<flags>]
defines what type of
.I identity assertion
is used.
This directive is obsoleted by
.BR idassert-bind ,
and may be dismissed in the future.
.TP
.B idassert-method <method> [<saslargs>]
This directive is obsoleted by
.BR idassert-bind ,
and may be dismissed in the future.
.TP
.B suffixmassage, map, rewrite*
These directives are no longer supported by back-ldap; their
functionality is now delegated to the
.B rwm
overlay; see
overlay. Essentially, add a statement
.B overlay rwm
first, and prefix all rewrite/map statements with
.B rwm-
to obtain the original behavior.
See
.BR slapo-rwm (5)
for details.
However, to ease update from existing configurations, back-ldap still
recognizes them and automatically instantiates the
.B rwm
overlay if available and not instantiated yet.
This behavior may change in the future.
.\" However, to ease update from existing configurations, back-ldap still
.\" recognizes them and automatically instantiates the
.\" .B rwm
.\" overlay if available and not instantiated yet.
.\" This behavior may change in the future.
.SH ACCESS CONTROL
The
......@@ -296,12 +407,35 @@ returned by the
.B search
operation is honored, which is performed by the frontend.
.SH PROXY CACHE OVERLAY
The proxy cache overlay
allows caching of LDAP search requests (queries) in a local database.
.SH OVERLAYS
The LDAP backend provides basic proxying functionalities to many overlays.
The
.B chain
overlay, described in
.BR slapo\-chain (5),
and the
.B translucent
overlay, described in
.BR slapo\-translucent (5),
deserve a special mention.
Conversely, there are many overlays that are best used in conjunction
with the LDAP backend.
The
.B proxycache
overlay allows caching of LDAP search requests (queries)
in a local database.
See
.BR slapo-pcache (5)
.BR slapo\-pcache (5)
for details.
The
.B rwm
overlay provides DN rewrite and attribute/objectClass mapping
capabilities to the underlying database.
See
.BR slapo\-rwm (5)
for details.
.SH FILES
.TP
ETCDIR/slapd.conf
......@@ -309,8 +443,10 @@ default slapd configuration file
.SH SEE ALSO
.BR slapd.conf (5),
.BR slapd\-meta (5),
.BR slapo\-chain (5),
.BR slapo\-pcache (5),
.BR slapo\-rwm (5),
.BR slapo\-translucent (5),
.BR slapd (8),
.BR ldap (3).
.SH AUTHOR
......
......@@ -310,6 +310,13 @@ dependent attributes are \fBNOT\fP generated at this point, for
consistency with the rest of slapd. This may change in the future.
.RE
.TP
.B check_schema { YES | no }
Instructs the database to check schema adherence of entries after
modifications, and structural objectClass chain when entries are built.
By default it is set to
.BR yes .
.TP
.B sqllayer <name> [...]
Loads the layer \fB<name>\fP onto a stack of helpers that are used
......
......@@ -41,9 +41,9 @@ directives that refer to the backend used for local storage.
The following cache specific directives can be used to configure the proxy
cache:
.TP
.B overlay proxycache
This directive adds the proxycache overlay to the current backend. The
proxycache overlay may be used with any backend but is intended for use
.B overlay pcache
This directive adds the proxy cache overlay to the current backend. The
proxy cache overlay may be used with any backend but is intended for use
with the
.BR ldap ,
.BR meta ,
......
......@@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ typedef struct ldapcontrol {
/* LDAP Chaining Behavior Control *//* work in progress */
/* <draft-sermersheim-ldap-chaining>;
* see also LDAP_REQUIRES_CHAINING, LDAP_CANNOT_CHAIN */
* see also LDAP_NO_REFERRALS_FOUND, LDAP_CANNOT_CHAIN */
#ifdef LDAP_DEVEL
#define LDAP_CONTROL_X_CHAINING_BEHAVIOR "1.3.6.1.4.1.4203.666.11.3"
......@@ -582,7 +582,7 @@ typedef struct ldapcontrol {
/* for the Chaining Behavior control (consecutive result codes requested;
* see <draft-sermersheim-ldap-chaining> ) */
#ifdef LDAP_CONTROL_X_CHAINING_BEHAVIOR
#define LDAP_REQUIRES_CHAINING 0x4110
#define LDAP_NO_REFERRALS_FOUND 0x4110
#define LDAP_CANNOT_CHAIN 0x4111
#endif
......@@ -726,6 +726,17 @@ ldap_set_rebind_proc LDAP_P((
LDAP_REBIND_PROC *rebind_proc,
void *params ));
/* V3 referral selection Function Callback Prototype */
typedef int (LDAP_NEXTREF_PROC) LDAP_P((